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Abstract
With  the  enforcement  of  the  Water  Framework  Directive  2000/60/EC (WFD),  policy  makers  are 
required to pursue the improvement of the use efficiency of the water resources in the agricultural  
sector. For this purpose, we suggest a methodology to perform an ex-ante analysis of the efficiency of  
water pricing policies, based on a two stage DEA technique, by which it is possible to disaggregate  
the technical and the ecological  efficiency of  the policy. According to our results,  we found that,  
coherently with the WFD principles, the direct pricing methods show the highest levels of efficiency.  
However,  we  have  also  found  that  some  indirect  pricing  methods  show relatively  high  levels  of  
efficiency.  Therefore,  since  the  high  cost  for  the  management  and  implementation  of  water 
measurement devices required to apply the volumetric methods, indirect pricing methods might still be  
preferable.
Key words: Data Envelopment Analysis, efficiency, water pricing, water framework 
directive
1. Introduction
With the enactment of the  Water  Framework Directive 2000/60/EC (WFD),  member  states are 
expected  to  revise  significantly  water  pricing  policies,  according  to  a  river  basin  management 
approach. The WFD emphasizes the need to fully consider the “polluter pays principle”, as well as the 
the full recovery cost for water use, including distribution, environmental and opportunity costs. In 
most of cases this new approach implies a dramatic reform of water pricing policies. 
Since the largest water  consumer  is represented by the agricultural  sector,  the analysis  of water 
policy  reform impacts  is  a  relevant  issue,  for  which  several  aspects  deserve  to  be  investigated. 
Furthermore,  in  different  climatic  areas  (e.g.  Mediterranean  basin),  the  water  resource  cannot  be 
substituted with other production factors, therefore an eventual water policy change is expected to 
affect the efficiency of the whole agricultural sector. For this purpose, the present study is focused on 
the analysis  of the efficiency of the agricultural sector,  under different water pricing policies.  The 
measure of the efficiency may be useful to support policy makers while choosing among alternative 
water pricing schemes.
In particular, this paper challenges a methodology to perform an ex ante analysis of alternative water 
pricing policies, consisting firstly on a simulation of alternative  water policy application, through a 
regional multi-agent linear programming model, and secondly on the analysis  of the results with a 
modified Data Envelopment Analysis,  as proposed by Korhonen and Luptacik (2004), allowing to 
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decompose the  efficiency into technological  and ecological  efficiency.  The technical  efficiency is 
calculated as  the  ratio  between the  weighted sum of  multiple  outputs  and  inputs.  The ecological 
efficiency emphasizes the concept that, in order to achieve a certain output, the production process 
necessarily  produces  also  some  undesirable  outputs  (pollutants,  or  emissions).  Therefore,  the 
ecological efficiency is calculated as the ratio between the weighted sum of multiple desirable outputs 
and undesirable outputs.
This methodology is useful whenever there are no informations about the relative importance among 
outputs or inputs. In fact, the DEA deals with variables regardless to their unit measure, and does not 
require assumptions a priori.
The paper shows an application of the methodology on a case study referred to the application of 
alternative water pricing policies on an irrigated area of the South of Italy. The volumetric pricing 
scheme, considered to be the most efficient, has been compared with indirect water pricing schemes 
(pricing  referred  to  area,  inputs,  outputs)  and  the  application  of  quota.  In  fact,  we  found  that 
volumetric pricing methods are the most efficient. However, also some of the indirect pricing methods 
have also shown a relatively high efficiency. Furthermore, the change of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) has also taken into account, and we found that it may significantly affect the efficiency 
of the water use, therefore water tariffs may require periodical adjustments. 
The structure of the paper is the following. In the next paragraph, we introduce the basic principles 
of the WFD and the characteristics of the most diffused water pricing methods. In paragraph 3 we 
propose the methodology for the ex-ante analysis of alternative water pricing policy,  based on a two 
step DEA methodology, by which it is possible to discriminate between the technical and ecological 
efficiency.  In paragraph 4, we present a case of study,  referred to an area in the South of Italy,  in 
which we compare the efficiency of volumetric pricing methods, with indirect pricing methods (input, 
output,  and  area  based),  and  a  quota  system.  In  paragraph  5  the  results  are  discussed,  while  in 
paragraph 6 some concluding remarks are discusses.
2. Pricing policy
The WFD is aimed at the pursuing of a good water quality status before 2015 all over EU member 
states. Within this period, EU member states are expected to reform their water regulatory framework, 
and the adoption of the full recovery cost and the polluter pays principles is recommended. 
The enforcement of the WFD will likely affects remarkably the agricultural sector, for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the agricultural sector is the largest water consumers, with share ranging 60-70% of 
fresh water  bodies.  Secondly,  the water  resource in some environmental  conditions,  represents an 
indispensable  input  for  intensive  cropping  systems,  that  are  very  relevant  either  for  producing 
foodstuffs, as well as a source of agricultural revenues.
In accordance with the WFD perspective, the economic theory suggests that the most suitable water 
pricing scheme is represented by direct pricing methods, based on volumetric systems. In this way, 
users will pay proportionally to their consumption, and a certain degree of fairness among users is also 
pursued.  However,  the  pricing  methods  are  not  always  able  to  take  account  of  the  externalities 
consequent to the water use. Crops differ in terms of environmental impact, that is not always related 
with the water consumption. Moreover, volumetric systems are costly and not suitable for monitoring 
of natural water sources (e.g. underground water, wells, etc.).  
Consequently,  there  are several  examples  of  alternative water  pricing methods  that,  though less 
efficient, may be offer several advantages, such as lower management costs, easier to be monitored, 
suitable  for  pricing  diffused  natural  water  sources.  In  this  research  we  compare  the  volumetric 
methods with the following indirect pricing methods: 
a) fixed per area pricing method: farmers have to pay an amount that is proportional to the irrigated 
farmland, but is not related with the demand of water. This method might be relatively easy to be 
managed and monitored through GIS systems. It is not fair and it does not represent an incentive for 
farmers to adopt water-saving cropping methods;
b) value of inputs specific to irrigated crops: the cost for water consumption is calculated according 
to the inputs necessary to the cultivation of irrigated crops (e.g. seeds, plants,  mulching materials, 
etc.). In many cases intensive crops are also responsible for externalities, therefore this method, to a 
certain extent, is coherent with the polluter pays principle;
c) value of outputs from irrigated crops: in this case the most profitable crops will lead to a higher 
cost  for  water  consumption.  It  is  relatively fair,  but  may not  induce  farmers  to  choose  the  most 
profitable use of water.
Besides these methods, we also consider the quota method, in which farmers are allowed to make 
the  best  use  of  a  limited  amount  of  water  resource,  for  which they pay a  discounted  tariff.  The 
application of tariffs lower than the marginal productivity leads usually to an inefficient use of the 
resource.
Alternative  water  pricing  policies  will  likely  induce  farmers  to  different  firm  strategies,  and 
therefore to a different performance. However, policy makers require a clear overview of the different 
outcomes deriving from alternative water pricing policies, and therefore a further analysis in required, 
through which the most suitable policy to the specific situation will be preferred (Tyteca, 1996).
It is necessary, therefore, to define a set of criteria, according to which the effects of the policy are 
measured. Inputs, outputs, and externalities can be measured in physical or value terms, but the most 
difficult task relies on the comparison of different performances.
In the case the relative importance of each criteria is already known, it is possible to proceed to a 
multi-criteria analysis, in order to obtain the ordered rank of the most preferred scenario. This sort of 
methodologies are generally referred with the term parametric analysis. 
However, there are many cases in which the relative weights between the criteria are hard to be 
specified. Therefore, non-parametric methods, such as the DEA, are suitable, since they do not require 
a priori assumptions, while the emphasis is put on the efficiency of the production process, that is 
generally defined as the ratio between outputs and inputs. 
The first non-parametric analysis to compare multiple desirable and undesirable outputs is reported 
in Fare et al. (1989), in which a 1976 data set of 30 US paper mills using pulp and three other inputs in 
order to produce paper and four pollutants.  In their  research they assumed weak disposability for 
undesirable outputs. Their results showed that the performance rankings of DMUs turned out to be 
very sensitive to whether or not undesirable outputs were included. The emphasis to the ecological 
issue has occurred later,  and generally externalities has been treated as undesirable outputs of the 
production process. Tyteca (1996) presents an exhaustive literature review. The DEA is frequently 
used  to  measure  the  efficiency  of  decision  units,  such  as  firms,  industrial  plants,  governmental 
departments (Glass et al., 2006; Bono and Matranga, 2005; Korhonen e Luptacik, 2004).  
In this paper, we adopt the modified two steps DEA, as firstly proposed by Korhonen and Luptacik 
(2004), in order to  measure  the technical and the ecological  efficiency of different  water  pricing 
policies.  This methodology allows the calculation of the relative efficiency and,  consequently,  the 
ranking of most efficient policies, either considering the technical and the ecological aspects.
3. Methodology
The evaluation  ex ante of the efficiency of the policy requires figures of the expected outcomes in 
terms of inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. For this purpose, econometric models or 
mathematical programming models are suitable to simulate the effects of the water pricing policy. In 
our case,  we adopted a multi-agent  regional  linear programming model  (Tisdell  2001; Berbel e 
Gutierrez 2005, Chinnici et al. 2006), mostly because we did not have time series referred to 
the  case  of  study,  or  referred  to  similar  areas.  Furthermore,  mathematical  programming 
models provide technically optimal strategies adopted by farmers, therefore the comparison 
between different policies would reveal the inefficiency related to the implementation of the 
policy for the specific case of study, and nothing else.
The objective  of  the  optimization  model  is  the  maximization  of  the  regional  agricultural  gross 
revenue (GR) of the region, as follows:
Max GR = Σj  λj [Σi(( xi,j  qi   pi  –  mlsi,j) – Σz (xi,j   ci,z vi,z ) – Σb Σz (xi,j   ai,b,r wi,b,r )) – Fixj + SFPj]    (1)
s.t.:
  Σi (xi,j  ts,i ) ≤ Ts,j  (farmland availability, for the j farm type and the s season)
  Σi (xi,j  ab,r,z ) ≤ Wb,r,j (water availability, for the j farm type, and the b water source typology)
  Σi (xj,i  lc,i ) + lrc,s,i  ≤ Lc,s,j (labour availability, for the j farm, and the c labour type, for the s season)
  where:
λj : weight of the j farm typology;
xi,j    : activation level of the  i production process, by the j farm typology;
qi , pi , mlsi,j : yield, market price, and parameter for model calibration, related to the i process;
ci,z , vi,z : technical coefficient of the z input, and its market price;
ab,r,i , wb,r,i : specific water consumption for the i production process, of the b source type, subject to the 
r tariffication scheme;
Fixj , SFPj : fixed running costs of the j farm, and the single farm payment, under the CAP regime.
The simulation of the policy is performed by modifying water tariffs and the quota allocated to each 
farm type. From the simulation of each policy, the most significant variables are selected, referred to 
critical inputs, desirable outputs, and undesirable outputs. These variables, that will be analyzed by the 
DEA technique, can be classified into three typologies: economic outcomes (e.g. added value, profit), 
technical indicator of performance, and environmental impact indicators (e.g. pollutant loads).
The DEA (Charnes  et al. 1978) is a technique based on the application of a linear programming 
algorithm, aimed to find the most suitable weights for each variable such that the ratio of outputs on 
inputs of several data set, is made as closer as possible to 1. Once the most suitable weights are found, 
from each data  pattern (performance  of  a  decision making  unit,  or  outcomes  of  each policy)  the 
relative efficiency index is calculated (the most efficient equal to 1, while other have a lower index).
In this research a modified DEA technique, proposed by Korhonen and Luptacik (2004) is applied, 
in order to separate the technical and the ecological efficiency of different water pricing policies. In 
case  of  the  comparison  of  n water  pricing  policies,  we  simulate  their  effects  through the  above 
discussed linear  programming  model,  and we find the  amount  of  m production inputs,  and the  k 
outputs.In particular, for k=1,2,..,r, we identify the subscript for desirable outputs, while for k=r+1, r
+2,..,  p,  we specify the undesirable outputs.  Therefore, in the case of the implementation of the  j 
policy, we have the vector xij of the inputs and the vector of outputs yrj.
The DEA technique consists of the two following steps:
a) measurement of the technical efficiency of the policy '0' (h0), according to the basic traditional 
model of DEA. The model is also named “Frontier Economics”, and consists of a linear programming 
model through which the (positive) weights to be applied to outputs (μr) and inputs (νi) are estimated, 
in order to find a ratio of output on inputs that is lower or equal to 1: 
Max h0=
∑r=1
k
r yr0
∑i=1
m
vi x i0
(2)
s.t.
∑r=1
k
r yrj
∑i=1
m
v j x ij
 1 , j=1, 2,... , n
r , v j , r=1, 2,. .. , k ; i=1, 2,... ,m
0 Non-Archimedean
b) measurement of the ecological efficiency (g0), through the calculation of the weights to be applied 
to the desirable outputs (μr) and the undesirable outputs (μs). This model is also denominated “Deep 
Ecology”: 
max g 0=
∑r=1
k
r yr0
∑s=k1
p
s y s0
(3)
s.t.
∑r=1
k
r yrj
∑s=k1
p
s y sj
 1 , j=1, 2,. .. , n
r   , r=1, 2,. .. , p
0 Non-Archimedean
Finally, Korhonen and Luptacik suggest a third optional step, in which the inputs are equal to  1, 
while the outputs are those obtained with the above models (h0 and  g0), in order to find an overall 
index of efficiency.
4. Case of study
4.1. The study area
The case study is referred to the area of Foggia province, located in the South of Italy, characterized 
by a Mediterranean climate, whit mild winter (temperature ranging 4-12 degrees), and summer hot and 
dry (temperature  ranging 20-42 degrees).  The yearly  average of  rainfall  is   500-700 mm,  mostly 
concentrated in autumn and winter, but  there are also recurrent periods of drought.  The potential 
evapo-transpiration reaches 5-6 mm/day during the third decade of July, corresponding to the period in 
which most of irrigated crops are in the vegetative stage (e.g. tomato, grapevine). 
The irrigation system consists of a network of underground pipelines, through which high-pressure 
water is conveyed to final distribution points, from which farmers may directly attach their devices 
(e.g. sprinklers, drip irrigation systems). The network is extended on the area of  442,000 ha, of which 
almost 32% can be potentially irrigated. The area is under the administration of 39 municipalities, 
although the management of the system is under the control of the land reclamation consortium of land 
owners, named Consorzio per la Bonifica della Capitanata (CBC). The irrigation campaign lasts from 
April to November, and every years the system conveys about 106 Million of m3 of freshwater most of 
which is accumulated in autumn and winter in artificial lakes and reservoirs.
Apart from the water conveyed by the CBC, the usage of water from other natural sources (most of 
which underground water) is also very diffused and it is estimated to cover about 60% of the overall 
irrigation water (INEA, 2001). 
At present, the CBC applies a volumetric pricing method, with increasing tariff system, aimed at a 
fair allocation of water volumes among landowners whose fields are served by the conveyance system. 
Farmers  are not  allowed to exchange the water use rights,  although the use of  water  is  indirectly 
transferred through the lease of the farmland. On the contrary, other water sources are almost out of 
control, and there is still difficult to delineate the precise state of depletion of natural sources, and in 
particular for underground water.
4.2. Data collection and modelling
The basic source of data is the 2000 Agricultural Census (ISTAT, 2000), in which farms are classified 
into three main groups, according to the hectares of cropped area:  
a)  less  than  5  ha  (18,199  farms),  in  which  the  owner  manages  directly  his  farm,  but  often  is 
employed also in an off-farm job. The most important crops are represented by orchards (grapevine 
and olive),  with almost 50% of the farmland, wheat, about 40%, and vegetable crops;
b) 5-20 ha (13,063 farms), managed directly by the owner, for which the farm is the main source of 
revenue. Most of the labour is provided by the farmer and his family, while other workers are hired 
during the pick season. The cropping pattern is strongly characterized by wheat (68% of the land), 
tomato (3%), sugarbeet (2%), vegetables (2%). Vineyard and olive occupy about 20% of the land;
c) larger than 20 ha (4,720 farms), managed directly by the farmer, but most of the labour is hired. 
Most of the land is occupied by extensive wheat cultivation (75% of the land), while the remaining is 
dedicated to intensive crops, such as tomato and vegetables. Tree crops are cultivated on 9% of the 
land. 
In any farm typology we assume the objective of maximizing the agricultural gross revenue, since in 
most of the farms the land, the labour, and the capital are provided by the farmer and his family. The 
detail of the calculation of the gross revenue is coherent with the equation (1) discussed in paragraph 3 
in this paper. In regards to the CAP, we considered two groups of scenario, one referred to the year 
2006, in which the single farm payment (SFP) system is applied only to arable crops and olives, and 
another referred to the year 2013, in which the SFP includes also the decoupled payments of the sugar 
sector, and processed vegetables (e.g. tomato).
The technical coefficients included in the linear programming matrix, have been monitored through 
ad hoc interviews to local experts and representative farms. We considered the agronomic rotations 
usually adopted by the farmers in the area. Input and output prices are based on the average local 
market prices (Bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce), but also taking into account of the farmers' 
expectations. We assume that the farm size is constant. 
The water resource availability is represented by two types of constraints. The first, referred to the 
amount  of  water  allocated by the CBC,  proportionally to the farmland served by the conveyance 
structure. The second, referred to other water sources, the availability is estimated by dividing the 
overall amount estimated by INEA (2001), for the overall farmland.
4.3. Water pricing policies scenarios
The scenarios we have considered, in order to evaluate the effect of the water pricing policy,  are 
compared with the baseline, that is referred to the actual situation (CAP 2006), in which arable crops 
and olive oil are under a free market regime, while farmers receive the single farm payment (SFP). 
However, since it is expected a further enforcement of the decoupled payments system of the CAP to 
the sugar and the processed vegetables sectors, we assumed a second group of scenarios (CAP 2013), 
in which sugarbeet and tomato are supposed to be sold to a free market, while the SFP is increased 
accordingly.
The scenarios simulating the enforcement of alternative water pricing policies are build by following 
two criteria. Firstly, we assumed the substitution of the actual pricing policy with an alternative policy, 
but considering to charge farmers with almost the same amount for the water. Secondly, we assumed 
the adaptation of the water policy to the WFD principles. Our interpretation of the WFD is that the 
water pricing should be able to divert some of the water from the agricultural sector, to other sectors, 
or to make it available to the environment.
1a.Baseline: referred to the actual situation, in which the water allocated by the CBC is charged 
according to increasing block tariffs (0.09 Eur/m3 up to 2050 m3/ha suitable of irrigation, 0.18 Eur/m3 
from additional 950 m3/ha, and 0.24 Eur/m3 in case of further consumption). The water from other 
sources (non-CBC) is free of charge, although farmers have to face the burden for pumping the water 
up to their irrigation systems. In average we estimate a private cost of 0.09 Eur/m3; 
1b.Baseline+: we assumed a significant increase of water tariffs applied by the CBC (respectively 
0.68 Eur/m3 , 1.35 Eur/m3, 1.80 Eur/m3), in order to save some of the water conveyed by the CBC. On 
the contrary, the non-CBC water is still free of charge; 
2a.Vol_tot: similar to the baseline, in which the CBC water is charged by increasing block tariffs, 
but with the difference that also the non-CBC water is charged by 0.03 Eur/m3;
2b.Vol_tot+: we assumed an increase of water tariffs either for the CBC tariffs (respectively, 0.45 
Eur/m3, 0.90 Eur/m3, 1.20 Eur/m3) and for the non-CBC (0.15 Eur/m3);
2c.Vol_tot++: we assumed an additional increase for CBC tariffs (respectively, 0.68 Eur/m3, 1.35 
Eur/m3,  1.80 Eur/m3)  and non-CBC tariffs  (0.23 Eur/m3),  in  order  to  divert  more  water  from the 
agricultural sector to other uses.
3a.Input: we applied an average tariff equivalent to the 17% of the specific costs for the inputs of 
irrigated crops. The water from CBC and from non-CBC sources is assumed to be free of charge; 
3b.Input+: similar to the above scenario, but we applied the 37% of the costs for the inputs;
4a.Output: the charge for the water consumption is calculated in average in terms of 8% of the 
outputs obtained from irrigated crops. No other charge for CBC and non-CBC water;
4b.Output+: similar to the above scenario, but we applied the 13% of the outputs obtained from 
irrigated crops;
6a.Quota: we assumed a regime with a constant water tariff of 0.09 Eur/m3, but a rigid constraint to 
the water availability to each farm, equal to  2,050 m3/ha; 
6b.Quota+: similar to the above, but the quota is limited to 1,025 m3/ha;
6c.Quota++: similar to the scenario 6.a, but the quota is limited to 820 m3/ha;
7a.Area: we considered a fixed charge per hectare of irrigated land of 205 Eur/ha, regardless to the 
consumption of water;
7b.Area+: the charge per hectare of irrigated land is 308 Eur/ha.
In order to simulate the group of scenario CAP 2013, we considered that prices for the commodities 
that are target of the reform (sugarbeet and tomato) are lower, while the SFP is increased accordingly.
5. Results
5.1. Simulated effects of alternative water pricing methods
The first type of results consists on the most relevant outcomes of the optimal solutions found through 
the linear programming model. In Table 1 we list the basic production inputs (land, labour, capital, and 
the water resource), the most relevant outcomes, from the point of view of the decision makers, such 
as economic performances (value added, value added per member of the farming family), desirable 
environmental impacts (land cover by vegetable crops, water saving), and undesirable environmental 
impacts (potential contamination by pesticides and nitrates).
By comparing scenario 2a. Vol_tot with the 1a.Baseline, we notice that an ideal implementation of 
the volumetric method also to non-CBC water  sources would not  lead to a significantly different 
results.  In  one  hand,  the  administrative  costs  for  the  implementation  may  not  be  worthwhile  in 
comparison  of  the  additional  water  charges.  However,  in  the  other  hand,  farmers  would  become 
conscious that water resources are not abundant, nor free of charge, since their use in agriculture imply 
a corresponding deprivation for other sectors, or for the environment. Furthermore, the enforcement of 
the WFD under the baseline hypothesis, is only possible to save CBC water (1b.Baseline+), while 
under the full volumetric method, the saving of non-CBC water is more straightforward (2b.Vol_tot+, 
2c.Vol_tot++).
The enforcement of the indirect water charge through the estimates of input or output values, seems 
to cause a dramatic abandonment of land, while from an economic point of view the impacts are not 
very evident (value-added and value-added per capita, of scenarios  3a.Input and  4a.Output). In this 
case,  the  enforcement  of  the  WFD aimed at  saving water  (scenarios  3b.Input+ and  4b.Output+), 
would lead to the abandonment of intensive crops, with a dramatic reduction of labour and economic 
performances. 
Finally, an area based pricing method (7a.Area) seems to cause a significant reduction of economic 
performances, that is even more emphasized with the enforcement of the WFD (7b.Area).
The introduction of a system based on individual quotas (6a.Quota), that is relatively easy to enforce 
by policy makers and accepted by farmers, is also associated to good performances in terms of value 
added. However, in the case of the WDF enforcement,  there would be benefits only for the CBC 
water, but non for other sources.
Under  the  CAP 2013 hypothesis,  it  is  evident  a  general  reduction  in  term of  water  saving,  in 
particular  in  the  case  of  the  indirect  pricing  on  inputs  and  outputs.  Probably,  farms  are  more 
competitive towards the market, but also more aggressive towards natural resources. Obviously, the 
application of quotas confirm to achieve the objective of water saving.

5.2. Analysis of the efficiency
In Table 2 the results of the two steps of the DEA are shown. Although the volumetric pricing method 
is supposed to be the most efficient, the analysis reveals that it depends on the tariffs applied, and by 
the CAP scenario. In fact, under the CAP 2013 scenario, the volumetric method is more efficient, 
probably  because  farmers'  strategies  are  more  market  oriented.  The  enforcement  of  the  WFD 
(2b.Vol_tot+, and 2c.Vol_tot++) are generally the most efficient.
The baseline performs in a similar to the volumetric method, showing that the pricing of non-CBC 
sources does not produce any significant improvement.
In the case of the indirect pricing method based on inputs,  we find a good performance,  that is 
confirmed also in case of the WFD implementation, either in the CAP 2006 and CAP 2013 hypothesis. 
Probably,  this  indirect pricing method is  sufficient  to internalize the externalities produced by the 
irrigation practice.
Table 2 – Analysis of the technical, ecological, and overall efficiency 
In regards to the indirect pricing on outputs, it is efficient only with the actual situation, while with 
the WFD, there is a loss of efficiency.
The quota system is generally less efficient in the CAP 2006 hypothesis, while in the CAP 2013 
hypothesis is is always efficent.
Finally, the fixed area pricing is the less efficient in every scenario, regardless to the WFD or the 
CAP reform.
Further details are shown in Table 3 and Table 3, in which for each scenario the determinant of the 
inefficiency for every scenario are analyzed.


6. Concluding remarks
According to the experience reported in this paper, the application of the DEA technique to simulated 
scenarios of water pricing policies appears to provide useful informations to policy makers. In fact, the 
efficiency is one of the objective pursued either by the WFD, and by the CAP.
Our results have proved that the volumetric pricing methods are the most efficient. However, since 
indirect methods may be easier to be implemented, we proved that under some circumstances they 
might be preferable, without losses in terms of efficiency. In our experience, for example, we found 
that the pricing based on the value of inputs specific to irrigated crops performed with the maximum 
efficiency in any scenario. On the contrary, other indirect pricing methods were have shown some loss 
of efficiency.
In regards to the methodology,  the disaggregation of the technical and ecological efficiency, may 
provide  additional  information  to  policy  makers,  in  the  case  in  which  the  achievement  of 
environmental objectives have a priority, in respect to other objectives.
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